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e under theAbstract With growing concerns about international spread of disease and expand-
ing use of early disease detection surveillance methods, the field of syndromic sur-
veillance has received increased attention over the last decade. The purpose of this
article is to clarify the various meanings that have been assigned to the term syn-
dromic surveillance and to propose a refined categorization of the characteristics
of these systems. Existing literature and conference proceedings were examined
on syndromic surveillance from 1998 to 2010, focusing on low- and middle-income
settings. Based on the 36 unique definitions of syndromic surveillance found in the
literature, five commonly accepted principles of syndromic surveillance systems
were identified, as well as two fundamental categories: specific and non-specific
disease detection. Ultimately, the proposed categorization of syndromic surveil-
lance distinguishes between systems that focus on detecting defined syndromes or
outcomes of interest and those that aim to uncover non-specific trends that suggest
an outbreak may be occurring. By providing an accurate and comprehensive picture
of this fields capabilities, and differentiating among system types, a unified under-
standing of the syndromic surveillance field can be developed, encouraging the
adoption, investment in, and implementation of these systems in settings that need
bolstered surveillance capacity, particularly low- and middle-income countries.
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The field of syndromic surveillance is best under-
stood through the context of global efforts to re-
spond and adapt to modern-day surveillance
challenges and disease threats. Globalization and
the ease of international spread of disease require
improved global surveillance capacity in order to
rapidly detect and contain public health emergen-
cies. Recognition of this need has led to increased
efforts to enhance disease surveillance and de-
mands examination of all available tools—one of
which is syndromic surveillance. Such thinking is
exemplified by the World Health Organizations
(WHO) decision to revise the International Health
Regulations (IHR).
As part of the 10-year IHR revision process, WHO
sponsored a pilot study in 22 countries from 1997 to
1999 to evaluate syndromic reporting. It was con-
cluded that ‘‘syndromic reporting, although valu-
able within a national system, was not
appropriate for use in the context of a regulatory
framework’’ [1].
The final negotiated IHR (2005) regulates detec-
tion, reporting and response within a more adap-
tive category of ‘‘events that may constitute a
public health emergency of international concern’’
[2]. The IHR (2005) also obligates every member
state of the WHO to build national core compe-
tency for disease surveillance. However, the regu-
lations do not prescribe exactly how nations are to
meet this core capacity. Certain low- and middle-
income countries—particularly those facing the
need to rapidly strengthen disease surveillance
and overall public health infrastructure to meettheir IHR (2005) obligations—may be looking to syn-
dromic surveillance options and opportunities. A
report from the IHR (2005) negotiations stresses
this point: ‘‘Because areas with the highest needs
for surveillance of communicable diseases have of-
ten the poorest surveillance systems, new surveil-
lance approaches, such as the surveillance of
syndromes, adapted to poor laboratory infrastruc-
ture should be developed to respond to the chal-
lenge of development gaps’’ [3].
In addition to the increased attention to syn-
dromic surveillance in the negotiations of IHR
(2005), syndromic surveillance has gained impor-
tance for national governments and has become
widely used at the country level, particularly in
high-income countries. Examples include a syn-
dromic surveillance system in the United Kingdom
based on data from the national telehealth system
(NHS Direct) and a system in Denmark that utilizes
ambulance dispatch records [4]. In the United
States (US), state and local syndromic surveillance
systems are widespread [5], as evidenced by a re-
cent survey that concluded, ‘‘populations covered
by health departments that reported conducting
syndromic surveillance account for 72% of the US
population’’ [6].
Spurred by a series of reports from the US
Government Accountability Office [7] and other
organizations [8], the US federal government has
recently begun re-examining how to best ensure
effective and efficient disease surveillance capac-
ity. In this context, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) must re-evaluate biosurveil-
lance for human health [9]. The United States
Agency for International Developments (USAID)
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mal disease surveillance, primarily focused on the
implementation of programs in developing nations
[10]. Researchers in the field of syndromic surveil-
lance have similarly turned toward translating
syndromic surveillance for use in lower resource
settings [11–13].
A 2007 Disease Surveillance Workshop held in
Bangkok, Thailand, sponsored by the Department
of Defense Global Emerging Infections Surveil-
lance and Response System (DOD-GEIS) and Johns
Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory
(JHU/APL), focused on the adaptation of elec-
tronic surveillance tools to low- and middle-in-
come settings [11]. In order to reenergize these
discussions (which were begun by 13 countries
and other stakeholders during the 2007 workshop),
clarification of the definition, functions, and chal-
lenges of syndromic surveillance is needed. Doing
so would help ensure that syndromic surveillance
will be adopted in all places where it would be
of benefit.
Since syndromic surveillance systems began
being used in the 1990s and became widespread
in early 2000, vast applications of these systems
have demonstrated many capabilities and uses.
There are numerous variations among syndromic
surveillance system definitions, objectives, and
surveillance methodologies, which is why there is
a need for a comprehensive characterization of
the breadth of the term ‘‘syndromic surveillance.’’
Common themes across the literature have
emerged, suggesting general agreement among
those in the field. The commonly accepted princi-
ples of syndromic surveillance include:
• Early detection and response: Most articles on
syndromic surveillance discuss the value of these
systems in signaling the presence of an abnormal
trend with ‘‘sufficient probability’’ to warrant
further investigation (without necessarily pro-
viding definitive detection) [14–20].
• Use of ‘‘continuously acquired’’ pre-diagnostic
information: By focusing on data collected prior
to clinical diagnosis or laboratory confirmation,
syndromic surveillance uses non-traditional
health indicator data [17,21,22].
• Possible situational awareness use: Chretien and
his co-authors describe situational awareness as
‘‘monitoring the effectiveness of epidemic
responses and characterizing affected popula-
tions’’ [12]. By providing a tool for following
the course of an outbreak, syndromic surveil-
lance has value besides merely initial detection
in augmenting public health surveillance as well
as outbreak response [6,11,15,23–25].• Providing reassurance that an outbreak is not
actually occurring: By monitoring outbreak
thresholds, as well as collecting data from a
variety of sources, a syndromic surveillance sys-
tem can provide information to public health
authorities confirming or refuting the occur-
rence of an outbreak [17,19,24,26].
• Augments traditional public health surveil-
lance: In order to improve outbreak detection
[13,17,19], several definitions of syndromic sur-
veillance emphasize that its goal is to ‘‘enhance,
rather than replace, traditional approaches to
epidemic detection’’ [14].Despite these points of agreement and the popu-
larity of syndromic surveillance systems in many
countries, there is still little or no consensus
regarding a standard definition encompassing the
full scope of the term ‘‘syndromic surveillance.’’
According to Mostashari and Hartman, the term syn-
dromic surveillance is ‘‘imprecise and potentially
misleading’’ [27]. The first point of confusion is
the fact that ‘‘many of the systems under discussion
do not monitor well-defined constellations of signs
and symptoms (syndromes), but instead target
non-specific indicators of health, such as a patient
with a chief complaint of cough or the sale of
over-the-counter cold medication; conversely,
many systems that do monitor syndromes (e.g.,
acute flaccid paralysis, Reyes syndrome, or carpal
tunnel syndrome) are not included in these discus-
sions’’ [27]. Second, some refer to the term ‘‘syn-
drome’’ as a specific, clinically defined
phenomenon, such as severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) or acquired immune deficiency syn-
drome (AIDS), and others use it more loosely and
non-specifically as simply a group of symptoms [28].
Several researchers have proposed alternative
names to differentiate the forms of syndromic sur-
veillance; however, these suggestions for clarified
terminology have not yet taken hold. Ten other
names that have been proposed in the literature in-
clude: outbreak detection systems, early warning
systems, health indicator surveillance, prodromal/
ic surveillance, information system-based sentinel
surveillance, pre-diagnosis surveillance, nontradi-
tional surveillance, enhanced surveillance, drop-in
surveillance, and biosurveillance [12,19,27,28].
Problematically, these terms overlap, contradict,
or are inconsistently applied, maintaining the
terminological confusion. Further, several terms
frequently applied to syndromic surveillance are
not adequately descriptive to convey the type of
system being referred to or do not distinguish
between types of systems, and thus may not be
appropriate as general, overarching terms. Given
24 R. Katz et al.the challenge of developing clearer terminology,
the potentially confusing term ‘‘syndromic surveil-
lance’’ is still being used [27].
Due to the significant increase in applications of
syndromic surveillance, and the new technologies
and expanded potential of the tool—demonstrated
by the evolution of the proceedings of the Interna-
tional Society for Disease Surveillance (ISDS) con-
ferences on syndromic surveillance [29]—it is
evident that the field has expanded over the last
decade. Thus, there is now an even greater need
for a consensus about what syndromic surveillance
means. Additionally, as plans to translate syn-
dromic surveillance systems to lower resource set-
tings proceed, a proper conceptualization of the
systems could increase their acceptance and effi-
cient use. The development and communication
of a unified understanding of the field may encour-
age governments or localities to adopt, invest in,
and implement syndromic surveillance, where
appropriate, and thus enhance compliance with
IHR (2005); this adoption in middle- and low-income
nations is being explored in the ongoing work to
identify exemplary case studies of successful utili-
zation of syndromic surveillance [30]. The purpose
of this article is to clarify the various meanings that
have been assigned to the term syndromic surveil-
lance and to propose a refined categorization of
the characteristics of the systems.2. Materials and methods
In an effort to capture the variety of definitions
and explanations of syndromic surveillance in the
literature, MEDLINE, Scopus, Google Scholar, pro-
ceedings from all ISDS conferences, and previous
literature reviews and reference lists related to
this topic were searched from 1998 to 2010. Search
terms included ‘‘syndromic surveillance’’ and the
10 other terms mentioned above, which are consid-
ered synonymous with syndromic surveillance. In
addition to general overview articles, the set of
articles pertaining to country- and region-specific
systems were narrowed by including the terms
‘‘low-income’’ and ‘‘developing country’’ to fit
the emphasis on the translation of these systems
to lower resource settings.
Through a review of titles, abstracts, and full-
length articles, 81 general articles were identified
describing and evaluating syndromic surveillance
systems along with several hundred articles
delineating surveillance systems implemented in
specific countries or regions. Within the articles
collected, those that defined syndromic surveil-
lance or provided a description of fundamentalaspects of these systems were selected and com-
piled for comparison. In total, 43 separate articles
defined syndromic surveillance, of which 36 pro-
vided unique definitions. A majority of the unique
definitions found came from overview of articles
of syndromic surveillance, rather than country-
specific articles. However, the country-specific
articles provided distinguishing examples of sys-
tems being implemented in various settings.
3. Results
Table 1 contains the 36 unique definitions of syn-
dromic surveillance found in the literature. The
five general points of agreement among those in
the field and mentioned above are frequently
noted in the definitions and are designated in the
set of columns on the far right. The two shaded col-
umns indicate that there are two fundamental cat-
egories of syndromic surveillance systems
conveyed by the collection of definitions. These
two categories involve the same investigational ap-
proach, and may even be components of the same
system, but monitor two distinct outcome types:
specific and non-specific outcomes. Within the
two fundamental categories of syndromic surveil-
lance (defined further below), all five principles
are relevant, with the principles of early detection
and response and the use of pre-diagnostic infor-
mation being the most commonly referred to
across the definitions.
3.1. Previous research
The literature review yielded multiple articles
that noted the distinction between specific and
non-specific surveillance systems. In a founda-
tional article introducing the field of syndromic
surveillance to a wider audience, Sosin explains
that indicators of a disease outbreak can either
be suggestive of ‘‘highly specific syndrome[s]’’ or
‘‘non-specific expressions of the target diseases
that occur before a diagnosis would routinely be
made’’ [18]. The following year, an article based
on recommendations from a CDC Working Group
contrasted surveillance of a syndrome that ‘‘is
relatively specific for the condition of interest’’
(such as acute flaccid paralysis as ‘‘a syndromic
marker’’ in the detection of poliomyelitis) to
surveillance with a broader purpose, such as
‘‘sexually transmitted disease detection and con-
trol’’ [35]. More recently, Fricker differentiates
‘‘well-defined’’ data that are ‘‘linked to specific
types of outbreaks’’ to data that are ‘‘vaguely
defined and perhaps only weakly linked to specific
types of outbreaks, such as over-the-counter sales
Table 1 Unique definitions of syndromic surveillance found in the literature, 1998–2010.
Article Article makes reference to
‘‘Specific
Disease’’
category
‘‘Non-specific
Disease’’
category
Early
detection
and
response
Pre-
diagnostic
information
Situational
awareness
Outbreak
re-assurance
Supplement
to traditional
surveillance
World Health Organization [1] X
World Health Organization [32] X
Buehler et al. [14] X X X X X X
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [33] X X X
Pavlin [21] X X X
Reingold [34] X X X
Smolinski et al. [28] X X X X
Sosin [18] X X X X
Sosin [19] X X X X X X
Buehler [35] X X X X
MMWR Editors [36] X X
Henning [26] X X
Lombardo et al. [37] X X
Mandl et al. [22] X X X
Stoto et al. [16] X X X
Ang et al. [38]
Berger et al. [17] X X X X
Stoto et al. [39] X X X
Chaves and Pascual [40] X
Morse [41] X X
Buehler et al. [6] X X X X X
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [20] X X
Chretien et al. [12] X X X X X
Chretien et al. [11] X X X
Fearnley [42] X X
Fricker [43] X X X
Fricker et al. [15] X X X X X
Jefferson et al. [44] X X X
Nordin et al. [39]
Tsui et al. [46] X
Buehler et al. [23] X X X
Gault et al. [47] X
May et al. [13] X X
Sintchenko and Gallego [24] X X X
Zhang et al. [48] X X X
Josseran et al. [49] X
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Table 2 Specific vs. non-specific syndromic surveillance categories.
‘‘Syndrome-based’’ surveillance (SBS):
specific disease/syndrome detection
‘‘Syndromic-non-specific’’ surveillance
(SNS): non-specific disease detection
Under-lying purpose ‘‘Case detection and management of diseases
when the condition is infrequent and the
syndrome is relatively specific for the
condition of interest’’ [35]
To answer the question: Is there anything
unusual or unexpected that public health
officials need to investigate? This category
focuses on detection of signals that ‘‘do not
have a specific risk event focus’’ [43]
System aims A developed syndrome (such as SARS, AIDS,
acute flaccid paralysis, or influenza-like
illness)
Early symptoms (such as gastrointestinal
complaints, influenza-like illness)
Example: an increase in gastrointestinal
illness cases indicating a water-borne
outbreak
Data sources ‘‘Constellations of medical signs and
symptoms in persons seen in various clinical
settings’’ [35], such as ICD-9 codes
In addition to the types of data sources at left,
unusual patterns in health-related behaviors
(e.g., over-the-counter and health product
purchases, such as cough medicine; and
absenteeism from work or school)
Example ‘‘The syndromes to be notified where an
outbreak is of urgent international public
health importance are: acute hemorrhagic
fever syndrome, acute respiratory syndrome,
acute diarrheal syndrome, acute jaundice
syndrome, [and] acute neurological
syndrome. In addition, any other syndrome of
severe illness not included in the above should
be notified if an outbreak is of urgent
international public health importance’’ [31]
‘‘[In developing countries,] syndromic
surveillance can identify outbreaks that do
not fall into pre-established diagnostic
categories, a capability essential for prompt
control of new or changing diseases’’ [12]
Southeast Asias Early Warning Outbreak
Recognition System (EWORS) provides
surveillance of 29 non-specific signs and
symptoms, which are not grouped into
specific syndromes [50]
26 R. Katz et al.of cough and cold medication or absenteeism
rates’’ [43].
Fricker continues his summary of the types of
syndromic surveillance by observing that the mean-
ing of the term ‘‘syndrome’’ has evolved in the
context of syndromic surveillance: ‘‘A syndrome
is a set of symptoms or conditions that occur to-
gether and suggest the presence of a certain dis-
ease or an increased chance of developing the
disease. In the context of syndromic surveillance,
a syndrome is a set of non-specific pre-diagnosis
medical and other information that may indicate
the release of a bioterrorism agent or natural dis-
ease outbreak’’ [emphasis ours] [43]. Clearly this
term ‘‘syndromic’’ as it is narrowly defined imper-
fectly captures the full range of these systems. An
adjustment of the term, while maintaining the root
of its meaning to ensure continuity in the field, can
help strengthen and expand understanding of this
field.
3.2. Proposed categorization
Table 2 outlines the two categories of syndromic
surveillance system types—specific and non-spe-
cific. As explained above and demonstrated in the
literature, the purposes of each syndromic surveil-lance category are different. Whereas the ‘‘spe-
cific disease/syndrome detection’’ category
focuses on detecting defined syndromes or a de-
fined outcome of interest, the ‘‘non-specific dis-
ease detection’’ category aims to monitor or
uncover non-specific indicators/trends that suggest
an outbreak may be occurring. Based on this dis-
tinction, an alteration of the term ‘‘syndromic
surveillance’’ to ‘‘syndrome-based’’ surveillance
(SBS) referring to the more specific type of surveil-
lance and ‘‘syndromic-non-specific’’ surveillance
(SNS) referring to the now more common, non-spe-
cific category of disease detection is proposed. The
categorization of SBS and SNS is confirmed by the
examined literature and will be used throughout
the remainder of the article to refer to these cate-
gories of surveillance.
Because of the terminological confusion with
syndromic surveillance, this proposed categoriza-
tion is necessary. Newcomers to the field of syn-
dromic surveillance frequently have a narrow
perspective of what these systems entail. Initial
misconceptions include the false belief that it is
surveillance based solely on syndromes (such as
acute flaccid paralysis) or that this type of surveil-
lance requires significant information technology
(IT) capacity. The former point is immediately
Redefining syndromic surveillance 27clarified by separating the definition of syndromic
surveillance into two separate terms: SBS and
SNS. The latter point concerning technological
capacity will be discussed later in the text where
the characteristic of technological dependence is
described as a gradation within the two larger
categories.
Other attempts to categorize syndromic surveil-
lance systems have also divided the field into two
separate components; however, these categoriza-
tions do not encompass the full range of systems
and most critical distinctions evident in the litera-
ture. One attempt separated systems into those
based on a ‘‘data collection system that is dedi-
cated to the purpose of this public health surveil-
lance’’ (e.g., during a specific event) and those
for the day-to-day monitoring of ‘‘data that are
routinely collected for other purposes’’ [27]. An-
other categorization divided systems by data
source: those data sources based on the use of
health-care services and those based on health-re-
lated behaviors [6]. While these are useful distinc-
tions to make when examining syndromic
surveillance systems, they are not the most funda-
mental. The proposed categorization within the
scope of this research addresses the most critical
distinction among syndromic surveillance systems,
which is the level of specificity of the outcome un-
der surveillance. The distinction between data
sources as sub-categories within each of the two
larger categories (specific and non-specific detec-
tion) is taken into consideration because there is
a fair amount of overlap. As noted in Table 2, the
data sources used in SNS systems can include those
data sources used in SBS systems, but frequently
focus primarily on pre-clinical data.
4. Data sources
Data sources for public health surveillance have
been traditionally divided into three levels: ‘‘pre-
clinical data, clinical pre-diagnostic data, and diag-
nostic data. Syndromic surveillance usually uses
two types of data sources: pre-clinical and clinical
pre-diagnostic data; traditional surveillance gener-
ally focuses on diagnostic data’’ [17]. These levels
can be further divided among the two categories of
syndromic surveillance, with the SNS category
being largely comprised of pre-clinical data,
whereas the SBS category is focused on clinical
pre-diagnostic data.
The 36 definitions are rife with examples of each
level of data source. Frequently cited clinical pre-
diagnostic data sources for the SBS systems in-
clude: patient chief complaints or ICD-9 coded
health information from clinical records (outpa-tient, emergency department, and hospital), bill-
ing databases, and emergency department triage
and discharge data. Though ICD-9 coded health
information is a form of diagnostic information,
experts in the field of syndromic surveillance
have suggested that general groupings of ICD-9
codes can be considered early diagnostic data
[33,35,38,43]. Pre-clinical data used in SNS systems
are often pulled from existing databases intended
for other purposes [21,22,24,27] and are therefore
‘‘weakly linked’’ to the target disease [43]. Exam-
ples include ‘‘. . . indicator (pre-diagnostic) data
(e.g., syndromes, medication sales, absenteeism,
patient chief complaints)’’ [12], pharmacy re-
cords, telephone health advice/consultation, poi-
son control centers, 911 calls, ‘‘phone calls to or
Internet use of a health-care information site’’
[18], laboratory test requests/orders [35], veteri-
nary health records, health department requests
for influenza testing [48], health care utilization
patterns [24], ambulance services, and number of
hospital admissions. Environmental data sources
and water utility complaint lines [17] are similarly
non-specific.
4.1. Classifications within SBS and SNS
Within the two overarching categories of SBS and
SNS, three additional sub-classifications became
evident through the literature review, specifically
surveillance to detect influenza-like illness and
possible bioterrorism events, as well as the grada-
tions in technological capacity.
4.1.1. Influenza-like illness
One common use of syndromic surveillance is for
the monitoring and detection of influenza-like ill-
ness (ILI), which is unique in that it falls within both
specific and non-specific surveillance categories.
As a specific syndrome, ILI can be used for monitor-
ing known strains: the ILI syndrome is useful for
‘‘clarify[ing] the timing and characteristics of an-
nual influenza outbreaks’’ [18]. Conversely, in
SNS, an increased number of cases of respiratory
symptoms and fever could indicate a bioterror-
ism-related event or a new strain of a virus with
pandemic potential.
4.1.2. Bioterrorism
As previously mentioned, syndromic surveillance
has evolved from specific disease detection to
encompassing more non-specific disease detection.
In line with this change, and in response to the an-
thrax event in 2001, syndromic surveillance came
to be seen as potentially useful for the detection
of bioterrorism outbreaks. Its utilization of data
28 R. Katz et al.from a variety of sources makes it a valuable addi-
tion to traditional surveillance methods [22]. While
bioterrorism detection is not typically the primary
use of syndromic surveillance today, non-specific
disease detection continues to be thought of and
investigated as a biosecurity tool [20]. Those in
the bioterrorism field explain that syndromic sur-
veillance, when applied to large, concentrated
events, can ‘‘detect the early manifestations of ill-
ness that may occur during a bioterrorism-related
epidemic. . . [such as] the prodromes of bioterror-
ism-related disease. . . [but] other uses of syn-
dromic surveillance include detecting naturally
occurring epidemics’’ [14], and it is more widely
applicable than as merely a tool for bioterrorism
detection [18].
The incorporation of biosecurity concepts into
the syndromic surveillance field has contributed
to the broadening of the five syndrome categories
defined by WHO in 1998 (‘‘acute hemorrhagic fever
syndrome, acute respiratory syndrome, acute diar-
rheal syndrome, acute jaundice syndrome, and
acute neurological syndrome’’) [31,51] to include
additional categories of symptoms that can be
monitored through non-specific surveillance. A
CDC-led, multi-agency workgroup identified 11
‘‘syndrome categories to be monitored that were
indicative of the clinical presentations of several
critical bioterrorism-associated conditions,’’
including several of the WHO syndrome categories
as well as more non-specific symptoms such as
‘‘rash’’ and ‘‘fever’’ [33,5,6].
4.1.3. Electronic capabilities
Within each of the two categories—specific (SBS)
and non-specific (SNS)—there are varying degrees
of technology that can be used for the syndromic
surveillance system. Depending on the data sources
available and the outcome of interest, some sys-
tems require significant IT and electronic capabili-
ties [6]. However, there are also examples of less
IT-dependent systems that monitor specific syn-
dromes and/or non-specific disease indicators
[44]. Thus, the distinction between high and low
IT dependence is considered a sub-category within
each of the two larger categories.
The literature review revealed that highly
automated systems tend to be used in more
developed countries, for large catchment areas,
and when there is a focus on bioterrorism. Typi-
cally, these systems involve electronic collection
and analysis of data [49], potentially utilizing
the ‘‘automated extraction of data from elec-
tronic medical records’’ [38]. On the other hand,
less automated, less IT-dependent systems are
more frequently seen in developing countriesand often incorporate some element of manual
data entry, extraction, or analysis, or the involve-
ment of fax or mobile technology [52], resulting
in detection that is ‘‘near real-time’’ as opposed
to ‘‘real-time’’ [53]. In a basic form, syndromic
surveillance ‘‘is a feasible and effective tool for
surveillance in developing countries’’ and should
be supported [13]. Given the significant applica-
bility of syndromic surveillance systems to low-
and medium-resource countries, it is critical that
the definition of syndromic surveillance not be
limited to highly IT-dependent, strictly auto-
mated systems. Clearly, though, where infrastruc-
ture allows, ‘‘automation of the full cycle of
surveillance’’ allows for more real-time results
[6].
5. Discussion
Early syndromic surveillance systems, including
those part of the 1997–1999 WHO pilot study and
as described in the 1998 Update on the Revision
of the IHR, were largely focused on monitoring
health events ‘‘for which the case definition is
based on a syndrome. . . e.g., acute hemorrhagic fe-
ver syndrome, acute respiratory syndrome’’ [32].
Over time, the systems have transitioned to moni-
toring less specific outcomes [43]. Morse summa-
rized this transition well: syndromic surveillance
‘‘once referred to the use of clinical syndromes
as criteria for reporting. Now, it usually means
data collected from automated non-diagnostic sys-
tems such as pharmacy records, ambulance call
categories, personnel absences, or emergency
department chief complaints’’ [41].
Of the 36 unique definitions found in the litera-
ture review, several appeared to be overly narrow
and might contribute to the confusion ascribed to
this term. Most of these narrow definitions sug-
gested that syndromic surveillance is limited to
highly IT-dependent systems, require automation
or immediate analysis, or are limited to one func-
tion, such as bioterrorism [16,26,39,45]. The liter-
ature review makes evident that many systems
that are considered ‘‘syndromic surveillance’’
are less IT-dependent, may include some manual
component, and have much broader applicability.
The importance of taking an all-inclusive view to
the field of syndromic surveillance is put best by
Fricker: ‘‘a myopic focus only on early event
detection for bioterrorism in syndromic surveil-
lance systems misses other important benefits
electronic biosurveillance can provide, particularly
the potential to significantly advance and modern-
ize the practice of public health surveillance’’
[43].
Redefining syndromic surveillance 295.1. Broadening the applicability of
syndromic surveillance systems
An important contribution of a syndromic surveil-
lance system is that it can be established in coun-
tries of any resource level. A broad definition,
accounting for all of the purposes of syndromic sur-
veillance—and acknowledging the flexibility of the
infrastructure requirements—will facilitate its
introduction and use in a variety of settings. A re-
cent review described 10 syndromic surveillance
systems in developing countries, demonstrating
the ‘‘feasibility of low-tech syndromic surveil-
lance in low resource countries’’ [13], EWORS
being one commonly cited example in Southeast
Asia [52].
In developing countries, data sources not tradi-
tionally employed in surveillance can be useful,
such as environmental sources assisting the detec-
tion of vector-borne and neglected tropical dis-
eases, monitoring indoor resting densities of
vectors, climate and land use data, and satellite
imagery [40]. Surveillance of sexually transmitted
infections could also be augmented by syndromic
surveillance. According to WHO, syndromic surveil-
lance of non-specific symptoms, including ‘‘ure-
thral discharge and genital ulcer, are potentially
useful for monitoring trends in STD incidence’’
[54].
5.2. Purpose of terminological clarifications
As the field has expanded, the truly broad nature of
these surveillance systems has become apparent.
Today, the term ‘‘syndromic surveillance’’ imper-
fectly describes all forms of syndromic surveillance
systems. Fearnley suggests, ‘‘This terminological
instability reflects an underlying ontological and
normative instability,’’ and without a generalized
consensus of the definition of syndromic surveil-
lance, ‘‘designers and users [may] continue to dis-
pute what syndromic systems can and should do’’
[42].
Based on the results of the literature review,
and in order to improve the conceptualization of
this term, it was necessary to categorize syndromic
surveillance into SBS and SNS, based on the funda-
mentals of specific and non-specific disease detec-
tion. The sub-categorization of the systems by data
source and IT-capacity required is based on the
broad range of features that constitute syndromic
surveillance systems. Prior categorizations, de-
scribed above, have not sufficiently encapsulated
all that syndromic surveillance can entail.
Recognizing that syndromic surveillance systems
comprise these two categories with two differentpurposes helps clarify the added value of this kind
of surveillance and may reduce ontological insta-
bility. It is recognized, as mentioned above, that
in practice, the distinction between specific and
non-specific syndromic surveillance categories can
be lost, since many of these systems—particularly
those in the United States—incorporate both cate-
gories within the same system. These dual-function
systems (specific and non-specific detection)
collect data from several sources—both the
pre-clinical and clinical non-diagnostic types. Nev-
ertheless, the acceptance and application of
improved terminology regarding these systems
can reduce ambiguity in the field and increase
adoption of syndromic surveillance systems where
appropriate. Future research must explore the
combination of the SBS and SNS systems in more
depth.
These ongoing questions highlight the impor-
tance of incorporating robust system evaluation
into future syndromic surveillance implementation
efforts. Empirical, quantifiable evidence about the
utility of these systems for improved surveillance
and detection must be established. Such evidence
will be essential for decision makers contemplating
investing in syndromic surveillance to help meet
IHR (2005) obligations.6. Conclusion
Despite early concerns about the benefits of the
syndromic approach to surveillance [34,42] and
the continued need for further research, this ap-
proach has been proven successful in a wide variety
of settings [5,17,18,30]. This paper has attempted
to take a broad perspective on the field of syn-
dromic surveillance, acknowledging the numerous
syndromic surveillance systems that have been
making important contributions to public health
for over a decade, and summarizes the terms many
definitions. By providing an accurate and compre-
hensive picture of this fields capabilities, and dif-
ferentiating between SBS and SNS, it is hoped
that syndromic surveillance will be seen more
widely as a tool that can help any nation (high,
middle, or low income) build comprehensive dis-
ease surveillance capacity.Contributors
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